000			03561cam a2200469 i 4500
001			21179776
003			SUN
005			20240214123620.0
008			190830s2020 enk b 001 0 eng d
010			_a 2019949400
020			_a9780198858584 _qhardcover
020			_a0198858582 _qhardcover
035			_a(OCoLC)on1121085185
040			_cSUNLIB
042			_alccopycat
050	0	0	_aR725.5 _b.P84 2020
060		4	_aWB 60
082	0	4	_a174.2 _223 _bPUG
100	1		_aPugh, Jonathan, _d1974- _eauthor. _921064
245	1	0	_aAutonomy, rationality, and contemporary bioethics / _cJonathan Pugh.
250			_aFirst edition.
264		1	_aOxford, United Kingdom ; _aNew York, NY : _bOxford University Press, _c2020.
300			_ax, 287 pages ; _c24 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aOxford philosophical monographs
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aIntroduction -- 1: Four Distinctions Concerning Rationality -- 2: Rationality and Decisional Autonomy -- 3: Controlling Influences -- 4: Coercion -- 5: The Practical Dimension of Autonomy -- 6: Informed Consent, Autonomy, and Beliefs -- 7: Rational Autonomy and Decision-Making Capacity -- 8: Rational Decision-Making Capacity in End of Life Decision-Making -- 9: The Prudential Value of Autonomy -- Concluding Remarks -- Bibliography -- Index.
520	8		_aThis is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics. Though the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as uncontroversial in this sphere, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether the reasons underpinning the choice are known and rational, or indeed whether they even exist. Jonathan Pugh brings recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand personal autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, he develops a new framework for thinking about the concept of autonomy, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in it. Pugh's account allows for a deeper understanding of d the relationship between our freedom to act and our capacity to decide autonomously. His rationalist perspective is contrasted with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and the revisionary implications it has for practical questions in biomedicine are also outlined.-- _cSource other than the Library of Congress.
650		0	_aMedical ethics.
650		0	_aAutonomy (Philosophy) _921065
650		0	_aRationalism. _921066
650	1	2	_aPersonal Autonomy. _915632
650	1	2	_aBioethical Issues. _921067
650	2	2	_aPatient Rights _xethics. _921068
650		7	_aMedical ethics. _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst01014081
650		7	_aAutonomy (Philosophy) _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst00824166 _921069
650		7	_aRationalism. _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst01090275 _921070
830		0	_aOxford philosophical monographs. _921071
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c7239 _d7239